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Abstract
This Essay first describes the shortfalls of the current enforcement regime under Regulation
17 and the practical problems that undertakings experience in enforcement proceedings. It then
discusses the suggestions for reform of Regulation 17. Finally, this Essay illustrates that although
amendments and changes to the current procedural rules could solve some of the problems under-
takings are facing in competition proceedings today, in order to address these problems effectively,
changes to the underlying institutional system will be necessary.
THE CASE FOR A REFORM OF REGULATION
17/62: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS FROM A
PRACTITIONER'S POINT OF VIEW
Frank Montag*
Regulation 17 should not be regarded as incapable of
change. It is not Pandora's box, which will release all human
ills if it is opened. Nor is it the Ark of the Covenant within
which is contained the law on the tables of stone. If it is an
ark, it is Noah's Ark, after thirty years needing refitting and a
new coat of pitch to match its sister ship the Merger Regula-
tion.1
INTRODUCTION
The competition law rules of the European Community
("EC" or "Community") have been in force for forty years. In
that time, there have been several small and some major reforms
and amendments to these laws, the most noticeable of these be-
ing the adoption of the Merger Control Regulation 2 ("MCR") in
1989. Surprisingly enough, however, the fundamental proce-
dural rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community' ("EC Treaty"), which are
* Partner, Freshfields Deringer, Brussels; Treasurer of the Studienvereinigung
Kartellrecht (German Antitrust Lawyers' Association) since 1994; Dr. iur., 1984, Univer-
sity of Bonn; LL.M., 1982, University of Georgia; First State Exam, 1981, University of
Bonn. A version of this Essay will appear in 1998 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. (Barry Hawk
ed., 1999). Copyright © Transnational Juris Publications, Inc., 1999.
1. HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ENFORCE-
MENT OF COMMUNITY COMPETITION RULES, FIRST REPORT, 1993-94, 142 [hereinafter
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST REPORT].
2. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. L 395/1 (1989), corrigendum O.J. L 257/
13 (1990), as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1310/97, O.J. L 180/1 (1997)
[hereinafter Merger Control Regulation].
3. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 0.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719
[hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended the Treaty es-
tablishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [here-
inafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, 0.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA].
820 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:819
contained in Regulation 17/624 ("Regulation 17"), have re-
mained unchanged for almost forty years.' Today, the European
Commission ("Commission") is pondering a number of sugges-
tions for reforms of EC competition law and its procedural
rules.6 The topics under discussion include a new approach for
dealing with vertical restraints. Following its Green Paper on
Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy7 ("Green Paper"),
set forth last year, the Commission has recently published pro-
posals for a new block exemption for vertical agreements as well
as for some procedural reforms.8 New block exemptions for
horizontal agreements are also under discussion.9 Furthermore,
the Commission published a draft regulation laying down proce-
dural rules for the enforcement of the Community provisions on
State aids. ° Moreover, the Commission recently adopted a re-
vised regulation on the hearings of undertakings in competition
proceedings.11 Finally, a major reform of Regulation 17, the reg-
ulation governing the Community competition law enforcement
procedure, has been under discussion for some time.
Of these various reform proposals, this Essay concentrates
on those regarding reform of the procedures for enforcing com-
petition law. There have, over the years, been many criticisms
made of the present rules of procedure for enforcing EC compe-
4. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62,
at 87.
5. In an area of law that is as dynamic as competition law, to have a regulation
remain unchanged for more than thirty years is a phenomenon in itself. Dieter Wolf,
EC Competition Law - The Millennium Approaches, in 1997 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 365
(Barry Hawk ed., 1998).
6. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, XXVIITH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1996 at 24-25,
66 (1997) [hereinafter COMMISSION, XXVIITH REPORT].
7. European Commission, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition
Policy, COM (96) 721 Final (Jan. 1997) [hereinafter Green Paper].
8. See Commission Communication, O.J. C 365/3 (1998) (from Commission on
application of EC competition rules to vertical restraints) [hereinafter Follow-up to the
Green Paper on Vertical Restraints]; see also Commission Proposal, O.J. C 365/27
(1998) (for Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation 19/65/EEC concerning ap-
plication of Article 85(3) of Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted
practices).
9. COMMISSION, XXVIITH REPORT, supra note 6.
10. See Commission Proposal, O.J. C 116/13 (1998) (for Council Regulation (EC)
laying down detailed rules for application of Article 93 of EC Treaty); see also Opinion
of the Economic and Social Committee, O.J. C 284/10 (1998).
11. Commission Regulation No. 2842/98, O.J. L 354/18 (1998) (on hearing of
parties with certain proceedings under Articles 85 and 86 of EC Treaty).
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tition law.1 2 While such criticisms have not gone unnoticed, the
reforms introduced to date have all been cosmetic in the sense
that they have left the basic procedural framework provided for
in Regulation 17 untouched. Increasingly, however, it is being
recognized that if the problems inherent in the current system
are to be fully addressed, some degree of structural change is
needed with respect to Regulation 17 itself.
The protection of free competition within the Community
has always been considered one of the fundamental principles of
Community law. In order to put this principle into practice, hav-
ing a system of rules that guarantee an effective enforcement
procedure is of fundamental importance. Therefore, the signifi-
cance of the procedural framework for the enforcement of com-
petition policy cannot be overestimated.
This Essay addresses the reform of Regulation 17 from a
practitioner's point of view. It is submitted that the quality of
any rules of procedure depends on the extent to which such
rules are able to fulfill three basic objectives. First, the enforce-
ment of the competition rules should be as fast, as efficient, and
as cost-effective as possible. Second, the procedures in place
should be transparent and should offer a sufficient degree of
legal certainty. Finally, there should be adequate procedural
guarantees in place to protect the rights of all the parties in-
volved. The current situation and the various proposals put for-
ward for reforming Regulation 17 must therefore be considered
in light of these three objectives.
This Essay first describes the shortfalls of the current en-
forcement regime under Regulation 17 and the practical
problems that undertakings experience in enforcement pro-
ceedings. It then discusses the suggestions for reform of Regula-
tion 17. Finally, this Essay illustrates that although amendments
and changes to the current procedural rules could solve some of
12. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST REPORT,
supra note 1; Alan J. Riley, Competition Procedures Re-evaluated: The House of Lords Report,
15 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 247 (1997); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Zukiinftige
Entwicklungen des Europiischen Wettbewerbsrechts, 1994 EuZW 647; Wernhard M6schel, Re-
form des europdischen und des deutschen Kartellrechts, 1995 EWS 249; Frank Montag, The
Case for a Radical Reform of the Infringement Procedure Under Regulation 17, 17 EUR. COMPE-
TITION L. REV. 428 (1996); Matthew Levitt, Access to the .File: The Commission's Administra-
tive Procedures in Cases Under Articles 85 and 86, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1413 (1997);
C.S. Kerse, The Complainant in Competition Cases: A Progress Report, 34 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 213 (1997).
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the problems undertakings are facing in competition proceed-
ings today, in order to address these problems effectively,
changes to the underlying institutional system will be necessary.
I. THE NEED FOR REFORM
The need for reform of the current enforcement procedure
has become apparent during the past thirty-five years of the ap-
plication of Regulation 17. It is useful to provide a short sum-
mary of the problems that have come to light with respect to the
Commission's practice. In assessing these problems, a general
distinction must be drawn between the two different procedures
covered by Regulation 17: the infringement procedure, which is
the procedure leading to a finding that Article 85 or 86 have
been infringed and ultimately to the imposition of fines, and the
notification procedure, which is the procedure applicable when
undertakings request negative clearance or an exemption from
the application of Article 85(2) for their commercial agree-
ments.
As far as the infringement procedure is concerned, many
companies feel that the current regime does not sufficiently
guarantee their procedural rights. The duration of proceedings
before the Commission has often been criticized as well and has
even lead to judicial proceedings before the Court of First In-
stance and the European Court ofJustice. Taken together, these
factors have led to a general lack of acceptance of Commission
Decisions in infringement procedures. With respect to the noti-
fication procedure provided for by Regulation 17, this Essay il-
lustrates that the major problem that companies are encounter-
ing today is a lack of legal certainty caused by the enormous
number of agreements notified to the Commission for an indi-
vidual exemption. The Commission is no longer able to deal
properly with these cases and has, therefore, been engaging in
the more than doubtful practice of sending comfort letters to
the parties that the Commission itself does not consider legally
binding.
A. Infringement Procedure
The shortfalls of the current rules governing the infringe-
ment procedure and the problems that arise from them in prac-
tice for undertakings have already been described by the author
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in greater detail elsewhere.13 The following assessment recalls
the most important issues.
Antitrust infringement procedures under Regulation 17 can
lead to the imposition of substantial fines. Article 15 of Regula-
tion 17 allows fines of up to ten percent of the turnover of each
of the undertakings participating in the infringement.14 A pro-
cedure leading to such serious sanctions must provide for the
full observance of fundamental principles of law designed to
protect the individual subject to the procedure. These include
the principle of in dubio pro reo as well as the fundamental rights
of defense, such as the right to be heard and the right to access
the Commission's file. The existing procedural rules laid down
by Regulation 17 do not sufficiently ensure that these principles
are respected.
Under antitrust infringement procedures, undertakings are
frequently given the impression that their defenses have not
been heard because the wording of the Commission's final deci-
sions is often almost identical to the wording of the Commis-
sion's statements of objections. This practice raises serious
doubts as to the practical value of the parties' rights of defense
in proceedings before the Commission. Although the undertak-
ings have a right to an oral hearing before an independent hear-
ing officer, practice has shown that it is extremely difficult for
the hearing officer to influence the position of the case handlers
within Directorate General ("DG") IV.5 It appears similarly dif-
ficult to influence the Commission's decision by submitting writ-
ten answers to the statement of objections. Again, practice
shows that the Commission rarely changes its position during
the course of the administrative procedure.
It is submitted that this practice effectively undermines the
fundamental principle of in dubio pro reo throughout the in-
13. See Montag, supra note 12.
14. For the calculation of fines, see European Commission ("Commission") Guide-
lines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation
No. 17 and Article 65(5) of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity ("ECSC Treaty"). O.J. C 9/3 (1998) (Commission Guidelines).
15. See Hartmut Johannes, Erfahrungen eines Anhorungsbeauftragten, in
EUROPARECHT, KARTELLRECHT, WIRTscHAF-rsRECHT, FESTSCHRIF" FOR ARvED DERINGER
293 (Everling et al. eds., 1993); Marc Van der Woude, Hearing Officers and EC Antitrust
Procedures: The Art of Making Subjective Procedures More Objective, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
531 (1996).
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fringement proceeding. 16 It appears that the fundamental rea-
son for this problem may be the fact that the Commission offi-
cials handling infringement cases function both as investigators
and as those responsible for drafting the final decision. Being
responsible for the case from the beginning of the investigation
until the drafting of the final decision imposing fines would ap-
pear to make any Commission official less open to the defenses
put forth by the undertakings. As a result, the burden of proof
in the administrative proceeding is practically reversed.
Moreover, the present procedural framework does not suffi-
ciently safeguard an undertaking's right to be heard and, in par-
ticular, its right of access to the Commission's file. Regulation
17 does not include any provisions on the right of access to such
files. It has taken years ofjudicial proceedings before the Euro-
pean courts for this fundamental right to be fully enforced, the
Court of First Instance finally doing so in the Soda Ash cases. 17
The exact scope of this right is, however, still unclear.' The
right of the parties to a hearing is laid down by Articles 19(1)
and (2) of Regulation 17.1' Additional specific provisions con-
cerning the hearing are contained in the recently adopted Regu-
lation 2842/98.0 It is hoped that the recent Commission notice
on the internal rules of procedure for processing requests for
access to the file,2 ' which the Commission adopted in order to
ensure compatibility between its administrative practice and the
case law of the Court of Justice, will effectively improve the situa-
16. See Montag, supra note 12, at 429-30.
17. See Solvay v. Commission, Case T-30/91, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1775, [1996] 5
C.M.L.R. 57; Imperial Chemical Industries v. Commission, Case T-36/91, [1995] E.C.R.
11-1847, [1996] C.E.C. (CCH) 137.
18. The Court of First Instance will, however, have the opportunity to further clar-
ify the scope of the undertakings' rights of defense in infringement proceedings in the
Steel Beams and Cement cases that are currently pending before the Court. In both cases
the parties have claimed that the Commission's decisions are invalid due to insufficient
access to the Commission's files, and in both cases the Court had ordered the Commis-
sion to give the parties full access during the court proceedings.
19. Council Regulation No. 17/62, supri note 4, art. 19(1), (2), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 92.
20. Commission Regulation No. 2842/98, supra note 11, O.J. L 354/18 (1998);
Follow-up to the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, supra note 8, O.J. C 365/3 (1998).
21. Commission Notice, O.J. C 23/3 (1997) (notice on internal rules of procedure
for processing requests for access to file in cases pursuant to Articles 85(2) and 86 of EC
Treaty, Articles 65 and 66 of ECSC Treaty, and Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/
890) [hereinafter Commission Notice on the Internal Rules of Procedure for Process-
ing Requests for Access to the File].
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tion. These rules have not yet been tested in court, however,
and they expressly do not relate to the rights of third parties and
complainants in particular.
Finally, another aspect of the enforcement procedure that
has been the subject of much criticism is the lengthy duration of
antitrust enforcement proceedings. An analysis of decisions
adopted by the Commission under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC
Treaty shows that on average it took the Commission almost four
years to adopt a decision. In some cases, the Commission took
as long as nine years and three months,22 seven years and ten
months,2 and six years and six months24 to make decisions. The
Commission is not subject to any legal time frames with regard
to the investigation and the adoption of a decision in antitrust
enforcement proceedings. This factor often leaves the undertak-
ings in a position in which for several years they have no indica-
tion whatsoever as to the outcome of the investigations carried
out by the Commission. As a result, undertakings have begun to
challenge Commission decisions before the Court of First In-
stance, alleging that proceedings of undue duration are contrary
to Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR").25
The Commission's practices with respect to infringement
proceedings bring to light several major flaws in the current pro-
cedural system, illustrating the need for fundamental reforms.
The Court of First Instance has accepted the basic argument that
the administrative proceedings before the Commission are sub-
ject to the procedural guarantees of Article 6 of the ECHR.26 In
Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf & Federatie Nederlandse
Kraanverhuurbedrijven v. Commission, however, the court held that
the duration of almost four years could not be considered undue
22. Commission Decision No. 92/212/EEC, O.J. L 95/50 (1992) (Eurocheque).
23. Commission Decision No. 92/163/EEC, O.J. L 72/1 (1992) (Tetra Pak 1I).
24. Commission Decision No. 85/202/EEC, O.J. L 85/1 (1985) (Wood pulp).
25. See Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf & Federatie Nederlandse Kraan-
verhuurbedrijven v. Commission, Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96, [1997] E.C.R. II-
1739. The Court of Justice will have to deal with this issue in Baustahlgewebe, Case C-
185/95, which is currently pending before the Court. Advocate General Lger, in his
opinion of February 3, 1998, took the view that overlong proceedings before the Euro-
pean courts constitute an infringement of Article 6 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") and that such an
infringement gives rise to a claim for damages.
26. See Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedriff, [1997] E.C.R. at 11-1764.
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because the duration of each individual stage of the proceedings
had not been excessively long.
Taken together, these shortfalls in the current procedural
system have led to a lack of acceptance of the Commission's deci-
sions in infringement proceedings. Only a small number have
remained unchallenged, whereas the large majority of decisions




Under Article 85, all agreements including provisions that
are restrictive of competition are in principle unenforceable and
must be notified to the Commission for an individual exemption
in order to be legally valid. As only a small number of agree-
ments are covered by the block exemptions adopted by the Com-
mission, there are an enormous number of cases pending before
the Commission. 28 Due to the Commission's limited resources,
it is practically impossible for it to deal with all these notifica-
tions in the way prescribed by Regulation 17. As a result, the
Commission adopted its practice of issuing so-called "comfort
letters" instead of formal exemption decisions. Comfort letters
are issued by DG IV itself, unlike formal decisions, which must
be approved by the entire Commission. The contents of comfort
letters vary on a case-by-case basis. There are both "negative
clearance" comfort letters sent if the notified agreement does
not fall within Article 85(1) and "exemption" comfort letters
sent if the agreement merits an individual exemption. Comfort
letters contain very limited reasoning in some cases, but more
often do not provide any reasoning at all. In general, the Com-
mission merely states that at the time that the comfort letter is
issued it does not see any reason to intervene against the respec-
tive agreement and will therefore close the file. The Commis-
27. See Montag, supra note 12, at 430-32 (setting forth list of cases).
28. In 1997 alone, the Commission opened 499 new cases under Articles 85 and
86, of which 221 were notifications. In 1996, there were 447 new cases, of which 206
were notifications and in 1995, of 521 new cases, 360 were notifications of agreements
under Article 85. The Commission is, however, still dealing with a considerable backlog
of cases. The overall number of Article 85 and 86 cases-including infringement pro-
cedures-pending before the Commission in 1997 was 1262. The Commission closed
as many as 517 cases in 1997, out of which only 27 were closed by a formal decision. See
COMMISSION, XXVIITH REPORT, supra note 6, at 38-40.
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sion reserves the right to change this view and may open pro-
ceedings at any time.
Comfort letters are not published and are only served on
the notifying parties. In most cases, the Commission merely
publishes a very short so-called "Carlsberg Notice" 29 in the C se-
ries of the Official Journal of the European Communities
("O.J."), which identifies, in a few words, the activities pursued
and requests comments. This way of proceeding offers the least
degree of publicity to the undertakings involved. In more com-
plex cases, the Commission tends to publish more detailed no-
tices in the C series of the O.J., describing the agreement in
question in more detail than foreseen by Article 19(3) of Regula-
tion 17. Comfort letters following such a detailed publication
have been termed "qualified comfort letters." Moreover, some
comfort letters receive even greater publicity through press re-
leases. None of these publications will, however, change the na-
ture of the comfort letter. A comfort letter is an informal admin-
istrative letter, not binding upon the national courts or the Com-
mission. Thus, in general, comfort letters leave the parties with
an entire lack of legal certainty, a fact that makes undertakings
feel increasingly uncomfortable.3 °
Although in principle the parties may demand a formal de-
cision rather than being content with a comfort letter, this
choice remains merely theoretical for two reasons. First, due to
the enormous backlog of cases it is unlikely that the parties will
receive a formal decision from the Commission in under two or
three years. There have even been cases where parties notified
agreements as long as fifteen years ago without ever receiving a
clearance decision to date. Second, there are even cases in
which the Commission, despite the fact that the parties insisted
29. These short form notices are named after the Carlsberg-Tetley case in which the
Commission first adopted this practice. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 97/21 (1992)
[hereinafter Carlsberg-Tetley].
30. Luis Ortiz Blanco takes the view that "in practice most notifying parties are
happy with comfort letters: around ninety percent of them reply in the affirmative to
the question on Form A/B asking whether they would agree to a comfort letter." Luis
ORTIz BLANCO, EC COMPETITION PROCEDURE 269 (1996). The mere fact that most un-
dertakings agree to close the proceedings with a comfort letter, however, does not
prove that undertakings feel comfortable with this practice. The primary reason for
agreeing to a comfort letter rather than insisting on a formal decision is the time factor:
undertakings prefer to have a, albeit non-binding, resolution in the foreseeable future
rather than waiting years for a formal decision.
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on a formal decision in their application form, still only sent
them a comfort letter and flatly refused to issue a formal deci-
sion.
This situation leaves undertakings with a lack of legal cer-
tainty as to the compatibility of their agreements with EC compe-
tition law. The Commission is not entirely unaware of these
problems, and in 1992 it adopted an internal guideline provid-
ing that in the case of a notification of a structural co-operative
joint venture falling under Article 85, the parties should receive
a first indication of the Commission's position within two
months following the notification."1 Thus, the Commission rec-
ognized undertakings' need for a timely decision and for a suffi-
cient degree of legal certainty in cases involving significant in-
vestments. Following the recent reform of the MCR, however,
all structural joint ventures, such as full function joint ventures,
must be notified according to the procedural rules of the MCR
and therefore no longer fall under the procedure provided for
by Regulation 17. The Commission has recently indicated that it
intends to apply time limits for an initial review to other notifica-
tions under Regulation 17 as well. In practice, however, the
Commission often takes considerably longer than two months
before issuing either a comfort letter or a warning letter.
Receiving a mere indication of the Commission's view and a
subsequent comfort letter within a relatively short period of time
may solve the time problem. It does not, however, solve the
problem of legal certainty. Undertakings are still faced with the
fact that they will not be able to receive a formal decision within
an acceptable time. Unlike the MCR under which the Commis-
sion must issue a formal clearance decision after five months at
the latest, undertakings planning a transaction that does not fall
within the scope of the MCR, but under Article 85 are forced to
build their investment on comfort letters if they do not want to
postpone the transaction for years while waiting for a formal de-
cision from the Commission. Undertakings are thus left with the
choice of either postponing a project for an indefinite time or
running the risk of going ahead on the basis of a comfort letter
that the Commission might renounce as soon as complaints
31. See Commission Press Release IP/92/1111 (Dec. 12, 1992); see also C.S. KERSE,
EC ANTITRUST PROCEDURE 2.28 (1994) (providing for detailed assessment of Commis-
sion's practice).
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from competitors or customers become known.3 2
II. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Practicioners have put forward a number of different pro-
posals for reforming the present enforcement procedure of EC
competition law under Regulation 17. The following part first
discusses suggestions put forward for amendments and improve-
ments to the existing procedure under Regulation 17. It then
turns to the more radical proposals suggesting modifications to
the existing institutional structure. These proposals may, there-
fore, be characterized as "institutional reforms."
A. Non-institutional Reforms
The proposals for non-institutional reforms of Regulation
17 may again be divided into reforms concerning the infringe-
ment procedure and reforms concerning the notification proce-
dure.
1. Infringement Procedure
As has been illustrated above, the major shortfalls in the way
that infringement proceedings are currently carried out by the
Commission are the insufficient guarantee of the undertakings'
rights of defense and the undue duration of the proceedings. In
order to remedy these defects, the following procedural reforms
have been suggested.
a. Strengthening the Rights of Defense
In order to improve the position of undertakings in in-
fringement proceedings and to ensure that their procedural
rights are respected by the Commission, it is important to have
clear guidelines on rights of access to the file. As already men-
tioned, the Court of First Instance acknowledged an undertak-
ing's right of access to the Commission's files in the Soda Ash
32. Ortiz Blanco argues that the Commission considers comfort letters as having
almost the same status as formal decisions and that, in the Commission's view, a case
could not be reopened at any later stage. ORTrIZ BLANco, supra note 30, at 272. Practi-
cal experience has proved this to be an overly-optimistic view. In fact, there have been
several instances in which the Commission reopened cases in which comfort letters
were issued following complaints by competitors and then demanded that amendments
be made to the agreement in question.
1999] 829
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cases.3 3 In these cases, the court held that the undertakings
must be granted access to all documents that could potentially
be exculpatory and that the decision regarding which docu-
ments are exculpatory could not be left to the Commission.
Although the general principle has, therefore, been established,
the Soda Ash rulings still leave open a large number of questions
regarding the precise scope of the right of access to the file, in-
cluding the question of who should have this right and at what
stage of the proceedings. Following the Soda Ash rulings, the
Commission adopted internal rules of procedure for processing
requests for access to the file.34 These guidelines are, however,
not legally binding and do not create individual rights for the
undertakings involved. A suggestion has therefore been made to
set forth provisions concerning the right of access to the file di-
rectly in Regulation 17 or in a separate regulation. Such an
amendment would provide the undertakings with legal certainty
as to the scope of their rights of defense and would also put
more pressure on the Commission to respect these rights strictly.
In order to tackle the problem of the lack of objectivity in
antitrust procedures before the Commission, the nomination of
an independent hearing officer responsible for proper conduct
of the Commission's oral hearing was introduced by the Com-
mission in 1982." 5 In 1994 the role of the hearing officer was
further extended when he was granted the power to decide who
is to be heard orally and whether third parties should be heard,
as well as the power to fix the deadlines for written replies under
Article 11 of Regulation 99/63.6 In order to cope with these
increased responsibilities it will, however, be necessary to ap-
point more than just one hearing officer, as is the current prac-
tice of the Commission.
Until February 1, 1999, the right of undertakings to be
33. See Solvay SA v. Commission, Case T-30/91, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1775, [1996] 5
C.M.L.R. 57; Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission, Case T-36/91, [1995] E.C.R. II-
1847, [1996] C.E.C. (CCH) 137.
34. Commission Notice on Internal Rules of Procedure for Processing Requests for
Access to the File, OJ. C 23/3, at 3 (1997).
35. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TWELFTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 1981, at 36-37 (1982).
36. Commission Decision No. 94/810/ECSC, EC, 0.J. L 330/67 (1994) (decision
regarding terms of reference of hearing officers in competition procedures before
Commission).
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heard was further elaborated on by Regulation 99/63. 3' Regula-
tion 99/63 confirmed companies' right to be heard prior to the
Commission adopting a decision against them. It also provided
for the conditions under which a company could request an oral
hearing, for example if such company showed sufficient interest
or if the Commission intended to impose a fine upon the under-
taking in question.3" Furthermore, Regulation 99/63 laid down
the procedure for hearings to be carried out by the Commis-
sion 3' and gave the Commission the right to set time limits for
the parties' submissions.40 In the transport sector, specific pro-
cedural rules on hearings used to exist.4
The Commission recently adopted a revised regulation on
hearings in procedures under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC
Treaty.42 Regulation 2842/98, which entered into effect on Feb-
ruary 1, 1999 and which replaces Regulation 99/63, Regulation
1630/69, section II of Regulation 4260/88, and section II of
4261/88, provides for a uniform procedure for hearings in all
cases involving Articles 85 and 86. This regulation distinguishes
between hearings of parties who received a statement of objec-
tions, hearings of notifying parties and complainants, and hear-
ings of other third parties. No such clear distinction was drawn
in Regulation 99/63. Regulation 2842/98 does not bring about
any fundamental changes to the rules under Regulation 99/63.
The rights of third parties, in particular of complainants, how-
ever, are clarified. Whereas Regulation 99/63 did not expressly
refer to complainants, Regulation 2842/98 provides that the
Commission has to send them a copy of the statement of objec-
tions and set a time limit for their comments.43 Moreover, if a
complainant so requests, the Commission may then give him the
right to take part in an oral hearing and to state his arguments
there.4 4 This clarification will certainly strengthen the position
37. Council Regulation No. 99/63, 127J.O. 2268 (1963), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-
64, at 47.
38. Id. art. 7, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-64, at 48.
39. Id. arts. 8-10, OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-64, at 48.
40. Id. arts. 2, 5, 6, 11, OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-64, at 47-49.
41. Commission Regulation No. 1630/69, 209J.O. 11 (1969), o.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1969, at 381; Commission Regulation No. 4260/88, O.J. L 376/1 (1988); Commission
Regulation No. 4261/88, O.J. L 376/10 (1988).
42. Commission Regulation No. 2842/98, O.J. L 354/18 (1998).
43. Id. art. 7, O.J. L 354/18, at 20 (1998).
44. Id. art. 8, O.J. L 354/18, at 20 (1998).
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of complainants in infringement proceedings.
Regulation 2842/98 also includes some changes to the ex-
isting rules, however, that will work to the detriment of under-
takings involved in proceedings under Articles 85 and 86. For
example, Regulation 2842/98 replaces written minutes taken of
oral hearings with a mere recording of such hearings.4 5 This re-
form was apparently introduced in order to speed up proceed-
ings, as the drafting of written protocols usually takes about six
weeks. It is doubtful, however, that the introduction of tape re-
cordings will indeed significantly speed up the infringement pro-
ceedings. Instead, there will be no written document on the file
to which either the Commission officials or the undertakings in-
volved can have access. The undertakings' oral arguments will,
therefore, no longer be included in the file in writing. This loss
of certainty does not seem to be outweighed by the time that
may be saved by abandoning written protocols. Moreover, Regu-
lation 2842/98 provides that the Commission is under no obliga-
tion to take into consideration statements that the parties sub-
mitted after the expiration of the time limit set by the Commis-
sion for written answers to the .statement of objections.4 6 This
approach constitutes a significant change, as compared to the
former rules under Regulation 99/63, which did not include any
indication that the time limit for answers to the statement of ob-
jections was a preclusive period.
Finally, Regulation 2842/98 does not address the issue of
interim measures. In its judgment in Camera Care,47 the Court of
Justice recognized the Commission's authority to adopt interim
measures, and the Commission subsequently adopted a practice
note on how it intended to make use of this competence. To
date, there are, however, still no formal rules of procedure cov-
ering interim measures by the Commission. It would be very de-
sirable from a business point of view to have such rules, in partic-
ular with regard to time limits for the adoption of interim meas-
ures by the Commission. Such time limits should have been
included in the revised Regulation 2842/98. Practitioners have
raised this point in their comments to the draft proposal for a
45. Id. art. 12(4), O.J. L 354/18, at 21 (1998).
46. Id. art. 4(1), OJ. L 354/18, at 20 (1998).
47. Camera Care Limited v. Commission, Case 792/79, [1980] E.C.R. 119, [1980]
1 C.M.L.R. 334.
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reform of Regulation 99/63. It is regrettable that the Commis-
sion did not recognize the practical need for such an amend-
ment.
b. Duration of the Proceedings
Tackling the problem of the undue duration of infringe-
ment proceedings before the Commission poses an even more
difficult quandary. It is impossible to provide for fixed timeta-
bles, at least in the first phase of the infringement proceedings
such as the investigatory phase. The time that a proper investi-
gation of a case requires depends on various factors such as the
complexity of the case, the number of undertakings involved,
the accessibility of information, etc. It is, therefore, impossible
to judge the necessary time in advance and to place a certain
time limit on an investigation. Only after the investigation itself
has been completed and the statement of objections has been
served on the parties, could certain time limits be introduced.
Time limits could, for example, be set for the parties' answers to
the statement of objections and for the Commission's final deci-
sion after receiving all comments from the parties. Such dead-
lines for the parties already exist, however, and are fixed by the
Commission in the statement of objections. All in all, it is rather
doubtful that the infringement procedure could indeed be sig-
nificantly sped up by introducing time limits.
c. Restructuring within DG IV
A solution that might at least partly solve the existing prob-
lem of lack of objectivity would be a restructuring of DG IV by
separating the investigation activities from the decision-making
process. This separation would provide a clearer distinction be-
tween the two stages of infringement proceedings with, in the
first stage, one administrative level carrying out investigations
and drafting the statement of objections and, in the second
stage, another administrative level drafting the first decision to
be adopted by the College of Commissioners.
After the first stage, the case would be transferred to an-
other administrative unit independent from the one that carried
out the first stage of the proceedings. At the second stage, the
respective officials would have to evaluate the evidence collected
in the first stage and the statements given by the parties in re-
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sponse to the statement of objections. This second administra-
tive unit should ideally be unbiased as to the result of the investi-
gations carried out by the first level and should approach the
case as objectively as possible.
There are, however, a number of deficiencies in this reform
proposal. First, it would require a significant increase in person-
nel within DG IV and would thus practically double the adminis-
trative expenditure for dealing with a case. Second, it is not un-
likely that the duration of proceedings would be prolonged be-
cause of the involvement of two separate groups of officials. As
both must study the case intensively, the overall time required
for dealing with the case would most certainly increase.
Thus, although offering a relatively easy way of introducing
more objectivity to the proceedings, a mere internal restructur-
ing within DG IV would thus not ultimately provide a satisfactory
solution for the fundamental defects in the infringement proce-
dure.
It should be mentioned that following a recent internal re-
structuring within DG IV, a new unit exclusively in charge of car-
tel investigations has now been formed.48 By contrast, under the
previous internal structuring of DG IV, each unit-other than
the Merger Task Force, which is exclusively dealing with the ap-
plication of the MCR-was allocated a certain industry sector
and was in charge of all infringement and notification proceed-
ings concerning that sector. Whether the new "Cartel Task
Force" will be able to handle infringement procedures more
quickly and more efficiently remains to be seen. It will certainly
not be able to solve the lack of objectivity of the proceedings.
2. Notification Procedure
Any reform of Regulation 17 with regard to the notification
procedure would have to attempt to provide a greater degree of
legal certainty for the parties and to speed up the proceedings in
cases where a notification to the Commission is necessary.
a. Reducing the Notification Requirements
As discussed above, most of the problems that undertakings
encounter today with the notification procedure under Regula-
48. Commission Press Release, IP/98/1060 (Dec. 3, 1998).
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tion 17 stem from the fact that an excessively large number of
agreements fall within the ambit of Article 85, as defined by the
case law of the Court of Justice, and must, therefore, be notified
to the Commission for an individual exemption in order to be
legally valid. The only cases in which a notification is not neces-
sary are agreements that are covered by one of the Commission's
block exemptions or those that do not have any significant influ-
ence on competition within the Community and, therefore, fall
under the de minimis rule. Due to the rather narrow scope of
these block exemptions and the large number of conditions that
an agreement must fulfill in order to benefit from the block ex-
emption, however, very few agreements are clearly caught. In
many cases, undertakings would rather notify an agreement in
order to avoid the risk that it might not be covered by the block
exemption.
Such notification is all the more important because the
Court of Justice takes the view that the entire agreement will be
considered invalid under Article 85 (2) -- even if only one clause
contained therein infringes Article 85 (1)-if that clause cannot
be separated from the rest of the agreement without the agree-
ment losing its commercial sense.49
Undertakings not notifying an agreement, therefore, not
only run the risk of partial invalidity of the clauses infringing
Article 85(1), but also face the possible consequence of their en-
tire agreement being void.
i. The Commission Proposal for Vertical Restraints
In order to reduce the number of cases in which a notifica-
tion is necessary, suggestions have been put forward ranging
from a general abolition of the notification requirement in favor
of an interventionist approach, to the less radical approach of
adopting broader block exemptions covering a larger number of
agreements than the existing block exemptions. In 1997, the
Commission opened a debate on the reform of the current noti-
fication system with regard to vertical agreements.5 ° In its Green
49. See, e.g., Etablissments Consten & Grundig Verkaufs GmbH v. Commission,
Joined Cases 56, 58/64, [1966] E.C.R. 299, 310, [1966] 5 C.M.L.R. 418, 475; Socit6
Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm, Case 56/65, [1966] E.C.R. 235, 245, [1966]
5 C.M.L.R. 357, 376; Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Brau AG, Case C-234/89, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-935, 1-990, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210, 250.
50. Green Paper, supra note 7, COM (96) 721 Final.
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Paper, the Commission listed various options for dealing with
vertical restraints in the future. After reviewing the written sub-
missions that the Commission received on the Green Paper, it
has now put forward a proposal for dealing with vertical re-
straints in the future. The proposal includes both a new broad
block exemption for vertical agreements and amendments to
Regulation 17. 5'
The Commission suggests adopting a broad block exemp-
tion for vertical agreements covering not only goods for resale,
but also intermediate goods and goods undergoing transforma-
tion, as well as services. The Commission also intends largely to
replace the present white list approach-which lists all clauses
that are exempted with the consequence that everything else is
not exempted-with a black list approach. The Commission
considers that this approach will give companies more legal se-
curity than the present narrow clause-based block exemption ap-
proach.52 Moreover, the Commission intends to introduce a
market share cap above which undertakings would no longer
benefit from the block exemption. The present suggestions are
to introduce either a one-threshold-system, where the threshold
would lie between the range of twenty-five to thirty-five percent
market share, and thus clearly below what is usually perceived as
the level of dominance, or a two-threshold-system where the first
and main market share threshold would be around twenty per-
cent. Above the twenty percent threshold, there would be room
to exempt certain vertical restraints up to a higher level of
around forty percent. 53
The Commission intends to combine this broad block ex-
emption with an amendment to Regulation 17, providing for the
possibility of retroactive exemptions for vertical restraints.
Under the present system, Commission decisions pursuant to Ar-
ticle 85 (3), in general, cannot take effect earlier than the date of
notification. 4 Only in cases covered by Article 4(2) of Regula-
tion 17, such as cases in which undertakings are not under an
51. See Follow-up to the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, supra note 8, O.J. C
365/3 (1998); Commission Proposal, supra note 8, O.J. C 365/27 (1998).
52. Follow-up to the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, supra note 8, O.J. C 365/3
(1998).
53. Id. at 19.
54. Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 4, art. 6(1), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 87.
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obligation to notify the respective agreement to the Commis-
sion, can the Commission grant a retroactive exemption taking
effect as of the date the agreement was entered into if the parties
decide to notify.5 In its follow-up paper to the Green Paper on
vertical restraints ("follow-up paper"), the Commission suggests
extending Article 4(2) of Regulation 17 to all vertical restraints,
thus enabling it to grant retroactive exemptions to vertical agree-
ments not falling under the broad block exemption.
ii. Further Proposals for Reform
Although the Commission's follow-up paper has, in general,
been perceived favorably by practitioners, the proposals put for-
ward therein may not be sufficient to solve the major procedural
problems undertakings are facing in notification proceedings to-
day.
First, it is doubtful whether the suggestions put forward by
the Commission will, in practice, indeed lead to greater legal
certainty for undertakings. The introduction of a market share
cap as the decisive factor in deciding whether a vertical agree-
ment falls within the block exemption will result in great practi-
cal difficulties for undertakings. The definition of the relevant
market and the calculation of the market shares of the parties
involved in that market are difficult and often involve complex
economic assessments. As any practitioner of competition law is
aware, the issue of defining the relevant product market and ge-
ographic market is one of the most difficult and often unreliable
exercises of competition law. Although the recent Commission
notice on the definition of the relevant market56 provides some
guidelines as to the method of defining markets, in practice it
does not make this assessment any more reliable for the under-
takings. The new block exemption for vertical agreements
would, therefore, leave undertakings with the problem that each
time they would try to establish whether a certain agreement
must be notified to the Commission, they would have to carry
out a complex market analysis before arriving at a conclusion
that, in any event, would be dependent on economic factors
rather than on a legal assessment.
55. Id. art. 6(2), 0J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 87.
56. Commission Notice, 0.J. C 372/5 (1997) (notice on definition of relevant mar-
ket for purposes of Community competition law).
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The possibility of retroactive exemptions under Articles
4(2) and 6(2) of Regulation 17 for all vertical agreements not
falling within the block exception will mitigate some of the legal
uncertainty resulting from the market share caps in the block
exemption. Retroactive exemptions will relieve companies of
the obligation to notify in advance in order to obtain the benefit
of an individual exemption ex tunc. The companies will not run
the risk of having operated under a void agreement if a notifica-
tion is handed in at a later stage. Thus, if a company makes a
mistake in assessing its market share and decides not to notify an
agreement to the Commission although the market share caps
provided for in the block exemption are exceeded, that com-
pany can still benefit from an exemption taking effect as of the
effective date of the agreement even if it were to notify the agree-
ment at a later stage.
The possibility of a retroactive exemption should, however,
not be limited to cases where undertakings made an error in
assessing their market shares, such as where the agreement in
question would fall within the block exemption were it not for
the market share cap. The follow-up paper leaves some uncer-
tainty as to this point by referring frequently to possible errors in
the parties' assessments of their market shares. Retroactive ex-
emptions should be available for all vertical restraints and the
parties should not be under any obligation to explain why the
agreement was not notified immediately after signature.
The possibility of retroactive exemptions will have to be
taken into consideration by national courts through litigation.
National courts will need to suspend the proceedings and wait
for the Commission's decision even where a notification is sub-
mitted after the agreement has entered into force. Because noti-
fications may, therefore, frequently occur when litigation in na-
tional courts has already arisen, it would be desirable for the
Commission to deal with such cases in an appropriate time
frame in order not to disrupt the proceedings at the national
level. One method of solving this problem could be a form of
opposition procedure that would lead to an automatic exemp-
tion if no action is taken by the Commission within a certain
time limit. Such opposition procedures already exist today
under some block exemptions, such as Regulation 240/96 on
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technology transfer agreements. 57 The rules for such a proce-
dure would have to be provided for in the proposed block ex-
emption for vertical restraints.
b. Fixed Timetable for Decisions
In order to solve the problem of the excessive length of time
that it currently takes for the Commission to adopt a formal deci-
sion in the notification procedure, it has been suggested that a
timetable be introduced for the decision modeled on the provi-
sions of the MCR. The practice of the Merger Task Force has
indicated that it is possible to carry out a proper investigation of
a notified agreement within one month in order to establish
whether the agreement needs to be reviewed more closely or
whether no serious competition law issues arise. There appears
to be no valid reason why the Commission should not be able to
perform a similar assessment with regard to Article 85 cases
within a comparably short time.
According to its internal guidelines, the Commission will
usually endeavor to perform a first assessment of the case within
two months of the date of notification. After this period, under-
takings should receive a first indication as to whether the Com-
mission sees any serious competition law concerns. In practice,
however, this internal rule is not always observed and the first
assessment often takes considerably longer than two months. It
would, therefore, be preferable to have a fixed timetable as pro-
vided for by the MCR.
After completing an initial review within a period of two
months, the Commission would have either to issue a clearance
decision or to serve a warning letter on the notifying parties,
thereby indicating that it will enter into a closer examination of
the case. The Commission should then have a sufficiently gener-
ous time limit for reviewing the more complex and problematic
cases for which a warning letter has been issued. This period of
time should be comparable to the duration of the second stage
investigation under the MCR. It is interesting to note, in this
context, that in the Commission's recent notice on the applica-
tion of the competition rules to access agreements in the tele-
57. Commission Regulation No. 240/96, art. 4, 0.J. L 31/2, at 9 (1996) (regarding
application of Article 85(3) of EC Treaty to certain categories of technology transfer
agreements).
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communications sector,58 the Commission takes the view that an
access dispute before a national regulatory authority (or "regula-
tory authority") should be resolved within a reasonable period of
time, normally not extending beyond six months of the matter
first being brought to the attention of the regulatory authority.
If this time limit is considered essential for an effective enforce-
ment of competition law by national authorities, then there is no
reason why this should not be true for decisions to be taken by
the Commission itself.
c. Decentralization
The issue of decentralizing the power to apply Article 85(3)
to national competition authorities (or "national authorities")
has been under discussion for a long time. It has been argued
that the burden on the Commission could be reduced and that
the principle, of subsidiarity could be put into effect if the na-
tional competition authorities were given the power to grant in-
dividual exemptions under Article 85(3) at least for a limited
number of cases. 59 So far, the Commission itself has been very
skeptical and, therefore, hesitant to adopt this approach.
In its recent follow-up paper to the Green Paper on vertical
restraints, the Commission for the first time suggested an albeit
very limited degree of decentralization of its powers under Arti-
cle 85(3) to national competition authorities. Under the new
block exemption for vertical restraints, national authorities
would be granted the power to withdraw the benefit of the ex-
emption under the regulation for their territories only if the
conditions of Article 85(3) are no longer met.6 ° If this proposal
is enacted, the national authorities will have the task of supervis-
ing the application of Community competition law in their terri-
tories at least with regard to vertical restraints. It is doubtful that
this proposal will significantly reduce the Commission's work-
load, as it will only include subsequent control of cases falling
58. Commission Notice, O.J. C 265/2 (1998) (notice on application of competi-
tion rules to access agreements in telecommunications sector).
59. For a discussion of this issue, see Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Implementation of EC
Competition Law by National Antitrust Authorities, 17 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 88 (1996);
Dieter Wolf, Mit der Verordnung Nr. 17 ins ndchsteJahrtausend?, 1994 WuW 289; SELECT
COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST REPORT, supra note 1, 11 133-36.
60. Follow-up to the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, supra note 8, O.J. C 365/3
(1998).
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within the block exemption, but will not include decisions on
applications for individual exemptions. Moreover, the Commis-
sion's proposal may lead to a situation where an agreement still
benefits from the block exemption in some Member States while
in other Member States the benefit of the exemption has been
withdrawn by the local competition authority. The consequence
would, therefore, be discrepancies in the legality of one and the
same agreement in separate national legal orders and a signifi-
cant degree of legal uncertainty.
These considerations illustrate that the issue of the Commis-
sion sharing powers under Article 85(3) is a complex problem
that requires a debate not restricted to the case of vertical re-
straints, but a more general one. It would, therefore, be prefera-
ble for the Commission to approach this issue on a more general
basis.
A delegation of the power to apply Article 85(3) and to
grant individual exemptions to national authorities would in-
volve serious problems.that should not be underestimated. The
Commission's role in the application of Community competition
law is and has always been to secure the uniform application and
development of the law. If the Member State authorities were
free to apply Article 85(3) to cases brought before them, a dis-
parity in the interpretation of the criteria for exemption under
Article 85(3) would almost certainly be the result. Whereas
some national authorities might tend to interpret the conditions
for exemptions strictly, others might be tempted to apply them
more leniently. It is not unlikely that forum shopping for the
most lenient national authority would be the result.
In addition, national authorities in general can only give
rulings regarding the territory over which they have jurisdiction.
The problem of mutual recognition of exemption decisions
adopted by national authorities would thus arise. If so-called
"full faith and credit" provisions were to be introduced and deci-
sions taken by a Member States authority were, therefore, auto-
matically valid all over the Community,, then the result would
most certainly be serious problems of acceptance. It is hard to
imagine the German Bundeskartellamt recognizing an exemption
decision taken by one of the relatively young national competi-
tion authorities in the existing Member States. This problem
would be further aggravated by the envisaged accession of new
Member States.
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Another serious problem that national competition authori-
ties would face due to the application of Article 85(3) is the
problem of conducting investigations in other Member States.
National authorities neither have the legal powers nor the neces-
sary resources to carry out investigations, including sending in-
formation requests to companies in other Member States. Only
the Commission has the necessary means to investigate cases af-
fecting markets in more than just one Member State. It is, there-
fore, hard to imagine how a national authority would be able to
deal adequately with notifications affecting markets that extend
beyond one Member State without the danger of neglecting im-
portant aspects of the case.
For these reasons, it is submitted that a decentralization of
Article 85(3) powers, if considered at all, should only be consid-
ered for cases with a clearly national focus, such as those in
which the restrictive effects of the agreement in question are ba-
sically restricted to the territory of one Member State. All cases
affecting markets in more than one Member State should be the
sole responsibility of the Commission. In order to ensure that
national authorities do not exceed their powers under Article
85(3), various possible control mechanisms could be put into
place. For example, a prioritization system could be put into ef-
fect under which the Commission would have the option to de-
cide, at the time of notification, whether it should deal with the
case or whether the Member State could carry on with its own
investigation. This type of system would place an obligation on
the Member State authority to notify the Commission automati-
cally of every Article 85(3) notification that it receives. This pro-
cedure would be similar to the procedure provided for by Article
19 of the MCR under which the Commission is obliged to trans-
mit to the national authorities copies of all merger notifications
in order to enable them to make requests for referral of cases.
In Article 85(3) proceedings, the Commission should then have
the power to take jurisdiction over a case if the agreement affects
competition in the territory of more than one Member State, it is
necessary for the Commission to decide the case in order to safe-
guard the uniform application of Community law, or the Com-
mission must reconcile conflicting decisions of national competi-
tion authorities.
Alternatively, a possible decentralization of Article 85(3)
powers might also provide for a priority rule identifying an ex-
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haustive list of cases over which the national competition author-
ities would have exclusive jurisdiction and reserving the remain-
ing cases for Brussels. Such a regime would, however, have the
disadvantage of being less flexible and of giving the Commission
less opportunity to exercise jurisdiction over cases that could be
better dealt with at the Community level.
In view of the serious problems that a decentralization of
the power to grant individual exemptions under Article 85(3)
would cause, it is doubtful whether there is much room at all for
delegating powers under Article 85 (3) to national authorities. If
such powers were to be reserved for cases affecting the markets
in one Member State only, then the number of cases eligible for
a decision under Article 85(3) would be significantly reduced.
In such cases, it is already doubtful whether competition in the
Common Market is affected at all, so there may not even be an
infringement of Article 85(1). Extending the national authori-
ties' powers to grant exemptions under Article 85(3) to multina-
tional cases would, however, cause even more serious problems,
as shown above.
d. Extending the Powers of the Competition Commissioner
A possible way out of the dilemma. caused by the excessive
number of cases before the Commission on the one hand, and
the rather complex procedure for the adoption of an exemption
decision under Article 85(3) on the other hand, might be to
delegate the power to adopt formal exemption decisions in clear
cut cases to the Competition Commissioner (or "Commis-
sioner") rather than to the entire College of Commissioners.
This approach was chosen in the MCR, in which the Commission
delegated the power to adopt a clearance decision in the first
stage of the proceedings to the Competition Commissioner by
way of an internal decision.61 Only in more complex and diffi-
cult cases will the Commission open second stage proceedings,
where the final decision is then adopted by the entire College of
Commissioners.62
A similar solution may be envisaged for exemption deci-
sions under Regulation 17. The central goal of such a reform
must be to facilitate the process of adopting formal decisions in
61. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 2, art. 6, O.J. L 257/13, at 19 (1990).
62. Id. art. 8, O.J. L 257/13, at 19-20 (1990).
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order to render comfort letters superfluous and thus to provide
undertakings with more legal certainty.63
Following the example of the Commission's practice under
the MCR, the power to adopt an exemption decision under Arti-
cle 85(3) in clear cut cases could be delegated to the Competi-
tion Commissioner. Alternatively, if the Commissioner should
find, after an initial review, that the case was not clearly eligible
for an exemption, the Commission could decide to investigate
the case in more detail and to issue a warning letter. Such a
procedure would relieve the Commission as a whole of the obli-
gation to take a decision in every notification case, but would
still provide the parties with a final decision that is enforceable
in the courts. Such first phase decisions could replace the pres-
ent comfort letters without putting too much strain on the Com-
mission.
It is questionable whether such a delegation might be possi-
ble by way of an internal Commission decision as provided for in
Article 11 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure64 or whether
it would require an amendment to Regulation 17 or possibly
even changes to the EC Treaty itself. According to the Court of
Justice's case law, which was reflected in the Commission's inter-
nal rules of procedure, the Commission may only delegate
clearly-defined management or administrative measures to one
of its members.65 It follows from the European Court ofJustice's
judgments in AKZO, 66 PVC,6 7 and Commission v. Germany68 that
decisions finding a person guilty of an infringement of Commu-
nity law are subject to the principle of collectivity, whereas
merely preparatory, intermediate decisions can be delegated. In
Commission v. Germany69 and ASPEC,70 the court stressed that
63. See SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST REPORT, supra
note 1, 1 120.
64. Commission Decision No. 93/492/EEC, OJ. L 230/15 (1993), amended by
Commission Decision No. 95/148/EC, O.J. L 97/82 (1995) (amending rules of proce-
dure) [hereinafter Euratom].
65. Euratom, art. 11, O.J. L 97/82, at 82 (1995)..
66. AKZO Chemic BV v. Commission, Case 5/85, [1986] E.C.R. 2585, 2614-16
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,366, at 17,380, 17,385-
386.
67. BASF and Others v. Commission, Case C-137/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2555, 1-2651-
52, [1994] 2 C.E.C. (CCH) 152, 220.
68. Commission v. Germany, Case C-191/95 (ECJ Sept. 29, 1998) (not yet re-
ported).
69. Id. 37.
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where the adoption of the decision is left to the Commission's
discretion and involves a thorough investigation of complex fac-
tual and legal questions, there is also no room for a delegation.
The present wording of Article 85(3) leaves the Commis-
sion broad discretion as to whether to grant an individual ex-
emption or not.71 It is therefore doubtful whether exemption
decisions under Articles 6, 7, and 8 of Regulation 17 can be dele-
gated to the Competition Commissioner by a merely internal
delegation of powers because there would be no clear guidelines
as to the cases eligible for a "first phase" decision. 2
It would, therefore, seem to be necessary for the Council to
adopt a formal change to Regulation 17, providing that in notifi-
cation procedures the Competition Commissioner can grant an
individual exemption under Article 85(3) in certain clearly-de-
fined cases.7 3 These should include easy and clear cut cases in
which there is no room for serious doubt as to the compatibility
of the agreement with the criteria listed in Article 85 (3), such as
cases in which the Commission is left with practically no discre-
tion to grant an exemption, as any other decision would consti-
tute a misuse of powers. Such a delegation of powers would not
appear to infringe the principle of collectivity as laid down by
Article 163 of the EC Treaty because it would only cover cases in
which the Commission's scope of discretion is limited and would
also only refer to decisions that are favorable to the undertakings
involved.
e. Administrative Fees for Exemption Decisions
The Commission's lack of resources with respect to person-
nel is frequently put forward as one of the main reasons for the
long duration of notification proceedings and the Commission's
inability to issue more formal exemption decisions. In order to
equip the Commission with the necessary financial means to pro-
vide DG IV with more staff, fees for individual exemptions in
notification proceedings and possibly also for decisions under
the MCR could be introduced. The collection of fees for deci-
70. ASPEC and Others v. Commission, Case T-435/93, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1281, II-
1323-24.
71. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable.
72. See KERSE, supra note 31, at 6.46.
73. See SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST REPORT, supra
note 1, 116-18.
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sions taken by national competition authorities is a common fea-
ture in several Member States including Germany, Ireland, and
the United Kingdom.
Provided that they are not excessively high, companies are
generally prepared to pay such fees to the competent competi-
tion authority if, in turn, they can rely on receiving a formal deci-
sion within an acceptable period of time. Having more legal cer-
tainty is perceived by companies as being well worth paying an
administrative fee.
f. Strengthening the Position of the Parties' Representatives
In notification proceedings, practitioners often encounter
the practical problem that under Regulation 17 and Regulation
3385/94 the Commission must serve all documents and deci-
sions on the parties, but there is no obligation to serve them on
the parties' representatives. In merger control proceedings, on
the other hand, all communications from the Commission are
made via the parties' representatives if such representatives have
been named by the parties in their notification according to
Form CO. Article 1 of Commission Regulation 477/98 T7 pro-
vides that notifications can be submitted by representatives who
are authorized to transmit and to receive documents on behalf
of the notifying parties. Section 1.3 of Form CO accordingly asks
for the name and address of one representative to whom all
communication shall be directed. 75 In proceedings under Regu-
lation 17 on the other hand, although Regulation 3385/94 also
provides for the possibility of appointing representatives, 76 Regu-
lation 3385/94 and Form A/B 77 do not give the parties the op-
portunity of appointing one representative to whom all commu-
nications will be directed. Lawyers are, therefore, frequently
faced with the problem that their clients have been contacted by
the Commission in writing or via telephone without the lawyer
being informed of these contacts. Even if the parties officially
appointed a representative in notification proceedings, the
74. Commission Regulation No. 447/98, O.J. L 61/1 (1998) (regarding notifica-
tions, time limits, and hearings provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89
on control of concentrations between undertakings).
75. Id. annex, O.J. L 61/1, at 11 (containing Form CO relating to notification of
concentration pursuant to Regulation).
76. Commission Regulation No. 3385/94, art. 1, O.J. L 377/28, at 28-29 (1994).
77. See id. annex, Form A/B, sec. 1.3, O.J. L 377/28, at 31 (1994).
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Commission often does not serve a copy of its final decision or
comfort letter to the officially-appointed representative.
This quandary leads to the problem that lawyers are often
not aware of the precise amount of information exchanged be-
tween the parties and the Commission and that lawyers will often
be the last to know that a decision or a comfort letter has been
issued. This problem could be solved by putting the parties' rep-
resentatives in the same position as they are under the MCR and,
in particular, under Section 1.3 of Form CO, for instance by pro-
viding that if representatives have been appointed by the parties,
then all written and oral communication must be directed to
those representatives.
B. Institutional Reforms
Although the above suggestions would help cure a number
of the problems existing under the current enforcement proce-
dure, they would not solve the fundamental problems undertak-
ings are facing today. In particular, the lack of objectivity in in-
fringement proceedings under the current system could not be
remedied by mere procedural reforms. In order to solve these
problems effectively more radical institutional reform will be
necessary.
1. The Creation of an Independent European Cartel Office
The idea of setting up a European Cartel Office (or "Cartel
Office") is not at all new, dating back to the earliest days of the
European Economic Community when the idea was first sug-
gested by the German Government. 78 In subsequent years, the
suggestion was made again, as criticism of the Commission's
combined functions as prosecutor and judge in antitrust in-
fringement proceedings grew stronger. The case for the crea-
tion of an independent competition law enforcement authority
was further revived with the introduction of the MCR, which was
adopted because it was widely felt that the exercise of merger
control should be left to an independent body rather than to a
political institution such as the Commission.
78. For a discussion of this proposal, see Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Reflections on a
European Cartel Office, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 471 (1995); Ehlermann, supra note 12,
at 650-52; SELECr COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST REPORT, supra note
1, 104.
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The concept of an independent European Cartel Office was
initially modelled after the German Federal Cartel Office, which
is an independent administrative body charged with the surveil-
lance of the principle of competition. Meanwhile, independent
antitrust authorities have also been established in Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, and the United Kingdom. According to the proposals put
forward,79 the scope of jurisdiction of an independent European
cartel authority should be restricted to the application of Articles
85 and 86 to private undertakings, leaving to the Commission
the public sector, such as the application of Article 90 and the
rules on State aids. It has also been suggested that the Cartel
Office's decisions should be made subject to an appeal to be
lodged with the Commission or the Council. ° Again, this pro-
posal is based on the German model. In Germany, decisions by
the Federal Cartel Office can be repealed by the Federal Minis-
try of Economics.
The main reason underlying the proposal for an independ-
ent European Cartel Office is the idea that an independent ad-
ministrative body would be less exposed to political influence ex-
ercised by the Commission 'as a political institution. This prob-
lem was, in particular, considered imminent in the field of
merger control. It was widely believed that the Commission's de-
cisions in this area would very much be influenced by political
rather than strictly competition law considerations. Practice has
shown, however, that this fear was largely unfounded and there
have been practically no cases where the College of Commission-
ers adopted a decision against the proposal of the Competition
Commissioner. As far as the application of Articles 85 and 86 is
concerned, the issue of political influence on the Commission's
79. See Statement of the German Federal Government on the Federal Cartel Of-
fice's Reports for 1989-90, Bundestagsdrucksache 12/847, June 26, 1991; Statement of
the German Federal Government, in 9 Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission
1990/91, Bundestagsdrucksache 12/5249, June 24, 1993 [hereinafter Statement of the
German Federal Government 1990/91]; Statement of the German Federal Government
on the Federal Cartel Office's Reports for 1991-92, Bundestagsdrucksache 12/5200,
June 24, 1993 [hereinafter Statement of the German Federal Government 1991-92];
Thomas Groger & Thomas Janicki, Weiterentwicklung des Europaischen Wettbewerbsrechts,
1992 WuW 991, 997-98.
80. See Statement of German Federal Government 1990/91, supra note 79; State-
ment of German Federal Government 1991-92, supra note 79; Groger & Janicki, supra
note 79.
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decisions has always been less important. Also, there has been
no evidence that over the past forty years the Commission was
guided by political rather than competitive considerations to a
greater extent than any of the national competition authorities.
Rather, it is submitted that the creation of an independent
competition authority whose decisions would then be subject to
political control by the Commission or by the Council would re-
inforce the possibilities of exercising political influence in com-
petition cases. Whereas under the present system the Commis-
sion is acting as an impartial enforcement authority whose sole
task is to apply Community competition law, under a revised sys-
tem the Commission would be free to take industrial policy con-
siderations into account. Such a system would, therefore, be
more likely to lead to political decisions than the present en-
forcement procedure.
Moreover, the concept of an independent European Cartel
Office would not seem to solve the fundamental problems faced
by undertakings with regard to the infringement procedure and
the notification procedure. The creation of an independent
Cartel Office would not strengthen the procedural rights of un-
dertakings in infringement procedures unless new procedural
rules were adopted at the same time. It would also not solve the
problem that the same administrative body is, at the same time,
acting as prosecutor and judge. Furthermore, unless the new
Cartel Office were to be equipped with considerably more offi-
cials, it would not be able to deal with the existing workload
within a shorter time either. Therefore, the idea of a European
Cartel Office does not provide a solution for the most important
practical problems in competition enforcement proceedings to-
day.
2. Infringement Decision by the Court of First Instance
A solution that would eliminate most of the shortfalls in the
infringement procedure would be to reallocate authority be-
tween the Commission and the Court of First Instance,"1 giving
the Court of First Instance the competence to adopt the decision
stating the existence of an infringement and imposing fines
upon the undertakings involved. The Commission, in turn,
81. This proposal has been set forth and explained in detail by Montag, supra note
12, at 435-36.
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would remain responsible for carrying out the investigation and
for drafting the statement of objections.
The Commission would be able to concentrate on collect-
ing evidence and conducting the preliminary procedure. Once
the statement of objections had been presented to the parties
and to the Court of First Instance, the Commission's involve-
ment with the case would end. It would then be up to the Court
of First Instance to carry out hearings of the parties and to evalu-
ate the evidence and the arguments presented to it by the Com-
mission and by the parties. The proceedings before the Court of
First Instance would end with the adoption of the decision estab-
lishing whether an infringement of Community competition law
took place and the imposition of fines.
Such a procedure would constitute a truly objective and fair
proceeding with two entirely separate legal bodies acting as pros-
ecutor and judge over the case. In the procedure before the
Court of First Instance, its general rules of procedure would ap-
ply, guaranteeing full respect of the parties' fundamental proce-
dural rights. This would make up for the possibility of some re-
strictions of procedural rights in the investigatory procedure.
The involvement of the Court of First Instance would also solve
the problem of the parties' right of access to the file, as the
Court of First Instance itself would decide who would be granted
access to the file and to what extent.
It is submitted that the involvement of the Court of First
Instance would not significantly extend the duration of the over-
all proceedings. The procedure before the Commission would
be significantly shorter than at present because it would end with
the issuing of the statement of objections. The review of the case
by the Court of First Instance would be made easier than under
the current procedure because the Court of First Instance would
have the Commission's full file containing all incriminating and
exculpatory pieces of evidence. Under the current system, the
Court of First Instance only receives those documents referred to
in the statement of objections. Proceedings are therefore often
unduly prolonged by the Commission's inability to produce cer-
tain exculpatory documents from the file upon the Court of First
Instance's request.
Although the adoption of a decision by the Court of First
Instance would, therefore, necessarily take somewhat longer
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than if one and the same authority were to carry out investiga-
tions and to adopt the decision, this possibility would be more
than outweighed by the fact that the decision was taken by an
independent court. Such a decision would be far more accepta-
ble to the undertakings and would in most cases render a further
review by a court unnecessary.
Thus, the separation of powers in infringement proceedings
between the Commission and the Court of First Instance could
effectively solve all of the fundamental downfalls of the present
enforcement regime.
III. OUTLOOK AND PERSPECTIVES
After forty years without any substantive changes, it is time
for reform of the procedure for the enforcement of Community
competition rules. A mere reform of the procedural rules laid
down by Regulation 17 will, however, not be enough to solve all
of the fundamental problems that undertakings are encounter-
ing in enforcement procedures today. Rather, the time has
come for an institutional reform creating new competences and
dividing competences between existing institutions.
Naturally, the proposals for institutional reforms outlined
above would necessitate fundamental changes in the EC Treaty,
and one might thus expect chances for such a reform to be
rather small. The chances for institutional reforms, in particular
with regard to the area of Community competition law and its
enforcement by Community authorities, are, however, not as re-
mote as one might expect. At the intergovernmental conference
in Amsterdam, the Member States decided to open the Commu-
nity for further applicants, in particular from Eastern Europe.
No institutional changes were adopted, however, in order to pre-
pare such accessions of new Member States. Rather, the Mem-
ber States adopted a protocol laying down that at least one year
before the membership of the European Union exceeds twenty,
an intergovernmental conference shall be convened in order to
carry out a comprehensive review of the provisions of the EC
Treaty on the composition and functioning of the institutions.82
Such a review will be necessary because the present institu-
82. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, Protocol
on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union, O.J. C
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tional framework is hardly suited for an enlarged Community
comprising more than twenty Member States. It is hard to imag-
ine how the Community institutions could continue to safeguard
the application of Community law in even more Member States
with even more official languages, taking into account the lin-
guistic problems caused by the recent accessions of Sweden and
Finland. It will, therefore, be necessary to approach fundamen-
tal institutional reforms in order to ensure that the Community
continues to carry out its functions even after the accession of
further Member States. It will be in the context of these neces-
sary reforms, as envisaged by the Treaty of Amsterdam,83 that the
chance to approach a new institutional concept for the enforce-
ment of Community competition law will arise.
340/1, at 111 (1997) (not yet ratified); see Commission Notice, O.J. C 340/111 (1997)
(notice on protocol on institutions with prospect of enlargement of European Union).
83. Id., O.J. C 340/1 (1997).
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